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The framework of categorical imperatives is one of the most famous deontological
theories of rights that have been formulated. The framework has often been used to justify
human rights policies all over the world. While they have been subject to several criticisms
over the last two centuries, some of these include improvements to the original framework.
This paper analyses the framework of the categorical imperatives and suggest certain
modifications to improve internal coherence.
The paper then seeks to apply this framework to the right to education, a right that is
under fire in the conservatively-charged political arena today. This is done to attempt to find
a deontological, rather than consequentialist, justification for certain modifications to the
education policies often pursued by the conservative right. This paper provides a more robust
theoretical justification for certain forms of education policy to be pursued by governments.
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INTRODUCTION
Kantian ethics have influenced the legal discourse on philosophical justifications for
human rights for the last two centuries.1 The idea of a comprehensive framework of rights
being developed on purely secular theoretical justifications2 appealed to legal thinkers of the
18th and 19th centuries who were increasingly inclined to separate religious morality from
laws. Despite its formulation prior to a number of historical events that have more or less
shaped the human rights rhetoric3 of today, the Kantian model of rights provides a foundation
for philosophical inquiries on the viability and enforcement of various human rights. While
the positive framework of law is the primary means by which human rights are enforced,
legal theory deals with the reasons for normativity human rights. A sound theoretical
justification for the universal enforcement of a right is one step towards its enforcement.4
Kant’s theoretical framework involving the use of categorical imperatives has been
subjected to criticism and counterarguments. This necessitates a closer inspection of the
framework itself prior to its application to any human right. While many of these criticisms
are directed at examples provided by Kant, it has been reasoned that the examples used were
symptomatic of the social mores of his times.5 Nonetheless, the idea of every person being
entitled to certain rights on account of their humanity, a concept captured within Kant’s
categorical imperatives, has dominated the language of international human rights law since
the conclusion of the Second World War.6 Scholars have also modified the categorical
1

See generally BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT (1993).
See Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
2009), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/legal-positivism/.
3
The rhetoric of human rights refers to the idea that human rights are an inalienable incident to human
existence. This idea was potentially propounded prior to the horrors of the holocaust, as will be detailed later in
this paper, but were brought to the forefront thereafter as may be seen in the formulation of the German
Constitution and in subsequent discussions during the preparations of the various human rights treaties.
4
It has been argued by some scholars that it does not matter whether or not a unified theory may be found to
justify a right as long as the right remains protected. See DUDLEY KNOWLES, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 155–76
(John Shand ed., 2001). It is nonetheless essential to have at least one theoretical justification for a right to be
protected. Jacques Maritain, in his introduction to the symposium edited by the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (“UNESCO”) on Human Rights, deals with the need for rational theoretical
justifications for human rights. Quoting one of the participants at a UNESCO National Commission meeting on
Human Rights, who explained the reason for agreement on a list of human rights by those of violently opposed
ideologies by saying that they all agreed about the rights as long as nobody asked them why. Maritain claims
that as long as there are conflicts regarding the justification of rights, there would be conflicts regarding their
interpretation. Jacques Maritain, Introduction to Human Rights Comments and Interpretations: A Symposium
Edited by UNESCO, U.N. Doc. UNESCO/PHS/Rev. 3 (July 1948),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001550/155042eb.pdf.
5
For instance, Kant has made many statements regarding the status of women in society that are quite blatantly
misogynistic. Analysis of the theoretical principles espoused by Kant himself, however, (particularly with the
categorical imperatives) provides various counter arguments against such sexist stances. See CAROL HAY,
KANTIANISM, LIBERALISM, AND FEMINISM 50–88 (2013). The primary problem with the analysis by Kant, as it
turns out, was more the fact that Kant did not apply the categorical imperatives to women in the same way as
they were applied to men due to his belief that they were not rational beings in the same manner (or to the same
extent) as men were, making women ‘less human’ and therefore, unentitled to the rights that accrued to rational
beings under the Kantian framework. See Sally Sedgwick, Can Kant’s Ethics Survive the Feminist Critique?, in
FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF IMMANUEL KANT 77–100 (Robin May Schott ed., 1997). While this does
question the applicability of Kantian thought to contemporary discourses on human rights, the foundational
principles that Kant derives his theories from have been used by various feminist scholars in countering
discrimination both within Kant’s writings and without. See generally FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF
IMMANUEL KANT (Robin May Schott ed., 1997).
6
See supra note 3.
2
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imperatives to overcome process flaws identified in the criticisms.7 Some of these improve
the coherence of the Kantian model, which will be discussed in this paper. The problem
remains that Kant’s theories had vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. However, the
importance of having a secular theoretical framework to justify certain human rights does not
abate. The right that I intend to focus on in my paper is the human right to education.
There are three primary reasons for singling out the right to education as a focal point of this
paper. Education (whether in a formal system of schooling or in a more informal context)
shapes an individual’s character8 and opinions9. The quality of one’s education can determine
one’s quality of life.10 Lastly, particularly with children, there is little or no agency in the
kind of education one receives. It usually depends on the resources available to each child’s
parents, the opinion of the parents on the kind of education the child ought to receive, and the
education policies of the state in which the child resides.11 The combination of the high stakes
(the quality of one’s life being determined primarily on the nature and quality of one’s
education) and the lack of any real autonomy of choice in the matter for most people (since
children are the primary target group) makes it important to ensure two things: first, that the
education system promotes the full development of individuals and minimises indoctrination
and second, that quality education be easily accessible. Both goals invariably require the state
to take positive steps in ensuring the right to education.
The right to education faces new challenges with the wave of endorsement that
conservative politics has received in the recent past. These conservative governments appear
to be pulling out of funding education in general.12 There is a move to shift the funding of
primary education to voucher-based systems, despite studies showing these to be
ineffective.13 Many studies have shown that voucher programmes to facilitate access to
7

See generally NEIL MACCORMICK, PRACTICAL REASON IN LAW AND MORALITY: LAW, STATE AND PRACTICAL
REASON (2008).
8
See generally, Bo Ekehammar, Ingrid Nilsson & Jim Sidanius, Education and Ideology: Basic Aspects of
Education Related to Adolescents’ Sociopolitical Attitudes, 8 POL. PSYCHOL. 395 (1987).
9
Id.
10
See generally, David M. Cutler & Adriana Lleras-Muney, Education and Health: Evaluating Theories and
Evidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12352, 2006),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12352; Philip Oreopoulos & Kjell G. Salvanes, How Large Are Returns to
Schooling? Hint: Money Isn’t Everything (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15339, 2009),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15339; Katarina R.I. Keller, How Can Education Policy Improve Income
Distribution?: An Empirical Analysis of Education Stages and Measures on Income Inequality, 43 J. OF
DEVELOPING AREAS 51 (2010).
11
See generally Phillip Brown, The ‘Third Wave’: Education and the Ideology of Parentocracy, 11 BRIT. J. SOC.
EDUC. 65 (1990).
12
Tracy E Gilchrist, Trump Deals a Blow to Michelle Obama, All Women, THE ADVOCATE (May 1, 2017),
http://www.advocate.com/women/2017/5/01/trump-deals-blow-michelle-obama-all-women; Lisa Lambert,
Trump Seeks to Shrink Federal Role in Education With New Order, REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2017),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-education-trump-idUSKBN17S2U8; Tom McCarthy, Trump
Administration May Scrap Michelle Obama’s Health and Education Programs, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/may/01/michelle-obama-school-lunch-let-girls-learn-scrappedtrump; Greg Toppo, Donald Trump Takes Aim at Michelle Obama Efforts on Child Nutrition, Girls’ Education,
USA TODAY, (May 1, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/05/01/trump-michelle-obamaefforts/101164922/.
13
Erica L. Green, Betsy DeVos Calls for More School Choice, Saying Money Isn’t the Answer, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/us/politics/betsy-devos-education-school-choicevoucher.html; Valerie Strauss, Study: Private School Vouchers Favored by DeVos Don’t Offer Real Advantage
Over Public Schools, WASH. POST, (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2017/02/27/devos-favors-private-school-vouchers-but-new-study-says-they-dont-offer-real-edge-overpublic-schools/?utm_term=.abe9abc5ccc0; Leah Askarinam, What a New Study on Vouchers Means for
Trump’s Agenda, THE ATLANTIC, (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/04/dovouchers-actually-work/524676/.
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primary education are likely to fail, unless coupled with governmental funding and support.14
The focus on vouchers appears to be primarily a result of conservative ideologies and free
market ideals.15 Alternatives that are more effective than the voucher system that have been
suggested by scholars in the past include increasing public spending on the education sector
as a whole, rather than leaving it to open competition to improve educational institutions.16
Conservative policies may also result in an exodus of academics from universities in the
United Kingdom.17 These policies are likely to have severe and long-term impacts on
children without access to quality education. One way of addressing these issues is to clarify
the nature of the rights in respect of education that a state ought to grant. A sound
philosophical justification in deontological ethics may persuade governments to consider
reasons for pursuing specific policies in respect of education. Arguments for state funding of
education based on the ineffectiveness of the voucher system (essentially consequentialist
arguments) do not seem to be convincing policy makers. Theoretical justifications for
specific education policies might render support to this goal.
In this paper, I analyse the categorical imperatives delineated by Kant to determine
the permissibility of acts and, consequently, the regulatory duties of an ideal state in relation
to such acts. In relation to the criticisms thereof, I utilise modifications to Kant’s categorical
imperatives suggested by jurists such as Rawls and MacCormick to arrive at a more coherent
framework of rights. Thereafter, I apply this modified framework to the right to education.
The question I address in this paper is whether a robust theoretical justification for the right to
education may be conceived in Kant’s theory of rights (I argue that it may). I have divided
the paper into two parts. In the first, I provide a brief overview of the categorical imperatives
and their vulnerabilities, together with modifications that strengthen the framework. In the
second part, I identify the obligations imposed on states in relation to the right to education
within this modified Kantian system, and the implications this has on state policies.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE DEONTOLOGICAL METHOD
The existence of ‘inherent rights’ for all humans has been the cause of much debate in
legal theory. Secular philosophising in legal academia around the time of Kant dismissed the
ideas propounded earlier by scholars such as Thomas Aquinas18 of “natural law” and “natural
rights” in favour of other means of circumscribing the notion of law and its evolution.19 One
of these was Kant’s attempt to bring in the scientific method into the question of ethics.20
Other forms included the Declaration of Independence of the United States and the
Declaration of the Rights of Man as aftermath of the French Revolution.21 The value of
14

Martin Carnoy, School Vouchers Are Not a Proven Strategy for Improving Student Achievement, ECON. POL.
INST. (2017), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/121635.pdf. See also Martin Carnoy, National Voucher Plans in Chile
and Sweden: Did Privatization Reforms Make for Better Education?, 42 COMP. EDUC. R. 309 (1998); Andrea
Tokman Ramos, Is Private Education Better? Evidence from Chile, (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No.
147, 2002), http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/studies/working-papers/147.htm; Martin Carnoy & Patrick J. McEwan,
Is Private Education More Effective and Cost-Effective Than Public? The Case of Chile (2011).
15
Carnoy, School Vouchers Are Not a Proven Strategy for Improving Student Achievement, supra note 14, at 10.
16
Carnoy, National Voucher Plans in Chile and Sweden, supra note 14, at 329.
17
See Cherry James, Brexit: What Now for Study Mobility Between the UK and the EU?, PÉCS J. INT’L& EUROP.
L. 7, 20 (2016).
18
See generally Mark Murphy, The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/natural-law-ethics/;
BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS (1997).
19
See Green, supra note 2
20
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (John Miller Dow Meiklejohn trans. 1855).
21
It has been opined that the two declarations sparked the beginning of secularisation of the rights discourse.
TRISTAN MCCOWAN, EDUCATION AS A HUMAN RIGHT: PRINCIPLES FOR A UNIVERSAL ENTITLEMENT TO
LEARNING 22 (2013). However, this may be disputed in the light of the fact that the French Declaration on the
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Kant’s theory of rights, particularly because the content of the rights elucidated being largely
parallel to the rights already delineated in the French and American Declarations and by
various philosophers prior to Kant, was in the process of deduction of these rights as opposed
to the subject matter and content of the rights so derived.22 Kant sought to apply his
categorical imperatives to all aspects of human life, including education.23 In his view, it was
education that distinguished humans from other animals.24 He believed that the education of
children often resulted in the treatment of children as instrumentalities rather than ends in
themselves, in violation of his second categorical imperative. However, some of his own
assumptions about education were also problematic, as will be discussed later in this paper.
The deontological process in Kant’s theories involves the application of Kant’s
categorical imperatives to any given choice of action in order to determine the legitimacy of
the act.25 Kant intended the categorical imperatives themselves to be universal, affording
respect to each person and to their personal autonomy.26 In contrast to the French and
American declarations,27 the categorical imperatives are arguably derived by logic, which, as
a foundational norm, is not based on empiricism but on a principle that is valid universally.28
While any sound moral theory will have to withstand the test of empirical validity, their
formulation cannot be entirely based on empirical grounds. If the formulation of the
categorical imperatives is coherent and based on a universally acceptable principle, the
categorical imperatives (derived solely from the foundational principle) themselves would
have to be accepted. For Kant, this foundational principle is that of rationality or reason.
‘Reason’ as a faculty of humans that bears consequence on will allows us to make decisions
not based entirely on instinct but also on the understanding of the nature of the acts we
perform.29
Naturally, the first question one faces in the justification of such a theory is on the
value of its foundational norm.30 There have been various criticisms of the idea of pure
reason being hierarchically more important than, for instance, emotion: one of the feminist
critiques to Kantian ethics is its disregard for emotions that may be seen to be equally
important as a foundational norm of human action.31 This has been criticized by scholars such
Rights of Man uses language such as “sacred rights” and “in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme
Being,” DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN pmbl. (France 1789), and the United States Declaration of
Independence describes all men as being “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.” THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). While the language of the two declarations was probably
instrumental in both the initiation and popularisation of the rights rhetoric as we know it today, labelling them
‘secular’ might not be entirely warranted.
22
Roger Hancock, Kant and the Natural Right Theory, 52 KANT-STUDIEN 440, 442-43 (1961).
23
See generally IMMANUEL KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY, HISTORY, AND EDUCATION, 437–85 (Günter Zöller &
Robert B. Louden eds., Mary Gregor et al. trans., 2007) (hereinafter ANTHROPOLOGY).
24
Id. at 439.
25
See generally Elijah Millgram, Does the Categorical Imperative Give Rise to Contradiction in the Will?, in
ETHICS DONE RIGHT PRACTICAL REASONING AS A FOUNDATION FOR MORAL THEORY 89–132 (2005).
26
Id. at 90.
27
Cf. ANTHROPOLOGY, supra note 23.
28
See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 1 (Thomas Kingsmill
Abbott trans., 1873) (hereinafter FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES).
29
See id. at 13.
30
See NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 90 (1984) for an example of a similar problem in the identification of theories of justice, whereby
the value of impartiality as a measure of justice being done is only relevant to someone who believes that
impartiality in decision-making is inherently valuable. There is no known way of modifying the stance of
someone who rejects the idea that impartiality in decision making is desirable.
31
Authors such as Carol Gilligan put forward the idea that a justice system based on pure rationality was
inherently patriarchal in its dismissal of human emotion as being hierarchically subordinate. Such a system was
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as Barbara Herman and Catherine MacKinnon. Herman argues that while emotions are very
often the prime drivers of human action, emotions are bereft of any normative morality and
are too subjective to provide grounding for moral theory.32 MacKinnon posits that to glorify
differences imposed on women is to support the disempowerment of women as a class.33 The
reality of human rights enforcement and conceptualisation is primarily focussed on its
normativity and its universality. Carol Gilligan’s theory does not reject the idea of universal
application of the relative importance of emotion in legal theory, but fails to acknowledge the
lack of universality in its foundation. Acts driven by emotion are neither accurately
predictable for the purposes of a moral theory that seeks to regulate human behaviour, nor
can any normativity be achieved in respect of such acts (or their regulation) without
foregoing impartiality. While acts dictated by emotion may very well coincide with acts
dictated by reason or morality, this may just be a matter of luck as opposed to a basis of
grounding the regulation of human behaviour.34 Further, there have been counters from
within the feminist discourse that have squarely placed the ethics of care within the Kantian
framework as well.35 A sound theory of ethics of care is perhaps essential for the justification
of any so-called welfare right, which I will discuss in due course.
The categorical imperatives derived by Kant are primarily principles to be used to
determine the legitimacy of any act. Under his theory, a system of regulation (the state) must
exist and prohibit acts that are deemed to be impermissible by application of the categorical
imperatives. Kant further formulates the ideal system of government and the manner of
regulation of individual behaviour under such an ideal system through the implementation of
the categorical imperatives, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
There are four categorical imperatives to test the legitimacy of any act. First, the act must not
be frustrated if the maxim of the act were to become a universal law.36 Second, that the act
should always treat humanity, every individual including the actor, as an end in themselves
and never as a means to an end.37 Third, that the maxim of the act, as the will of a rational
being laying down universal law, should not frustrate the will of every natural being.38
Fourth, that the act should not contradict the autonomy of the will when the maxim of the act
is universalized.39 Any act must necessarily be compatible with all four categorical
imperatives in order to be deemed legitimate and permissible. If an act is rendered impossible
or redundant by application of even one of the four imperatives, the act, per Kant, must not be
performed.

responsible for what Gilligan describes as a clash between morality based on rights and reason and morality
based on ethics of care and responsibility. One example of such a clash, as described by Gilligan, was the
dilemma of a lawyer with information that would support the claim of the opposite party at a trial – the lawyer
has a duty to the client not to reveal this information, but withholding it frustrates an otherwise meritorious
claim by the opposite party, rendering the adversarial system that allows such a clash as inherently anti-care and
possibly unjust, if the ethics of responsibility and care are viewed as being as important as rationality. CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 128–60 (1982); see also Lawrence A. Blum, Kant’s and Hegel’s Moral
Rationalism: A Feminist Perspective, 12 CAN. J. PHILO. 287, 294 (1982).
32
See Barbara Herman, Integrity and Impartiality, 66 THE MONIST 233, 234 (1983).
33
See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 39 (1987).
34
Sedgwick, supra note 5, at 81.
35
See generally Robin May Schott, Introduction to Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant, supra note 5, at
6–15; Herta Nagl-Docekal, Feminist Ethics: How it Could Benefit from Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in id. at 101–
24.
36
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 28, at 38.
37
Id. at 45.
38
Id. at 48.
39
Id. at 51–53.
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Certain primary assumptions regarding the nature of human existence are made prior
to the derivation of the categorical imperatives; first, the human instinct of self-preservation,
and second, the social nature of human existence. The absence of either renders the entire
exercise of deriving legal theories and moral philosophies for the regulation of human
conduct rather irrelevant. In our bare states, stripped of all knowledge, society and
experience, the sole aim that drives us will necessarily be our instinctive will to survive.40
Self-preservation thus stands as a basic rule of existence independent of all others and
incapable of contradiction from any field.41 Consequently, under no circumstances can any
act seek to infringe on survival of the individual, which is where the concept of universal
respect for each person is originates. I would have to insert the caveat that when I speak of an
‘act’, I speak of acts performed by humans and therefore subject to regulations as may be
enforced under societal regimes. Naturally, there are acts that may be performed that may
contradict the instinct of self-preservation; one may decide to end one’s life without regard to
any regulatory prohibition of it. However, in the event of every individual choosing to end
their life, the question of legal theory to regulate or prohibit such extermination is once again
rendered irrelevant.42 The same logic also applies to the assumption of the existence of a
society to or against which a legal theory may be applied or tested.
The first categorical imperative deals with the problems raised by the fact of man’s
social existence. If humans were to live as isolated creatures who never met each other, any
physically possible act would be permissible simply because other people would not be
affected by it. Once we take into consideration the fact of human interaction, we are
necessarily limited in the scope of our acts by the existence of other independent actors
possessed of wills of their own. By universalizing the maxim of any act performed by one
individual, Kant implicitly incorporates an idea of equality between the wills of each
individual actor in the thought experiment. There would be no need to consider the effects of
universalization of these maxims if it were acceptable that one person’s will was of greater
value or more authoritative than the will of the other people, whether or not such people are
affected by this exercise of will. Although this categorical imperative touches upon the
autonomy of every individual, the underlying assumption, as elucidated by scholars such as
Ronald Dworkin43, is the equality of such freedom amongst the individuals.
One of the criticisms to the universalization of the maxim of the act has been the lack
of clarity as to what exactly is to be universalized when one speaks of the ‘maxim of the
act’.44 From the perspective of critical legal studies, for instance, every single factor that
affected the decision of the actor must be taken into account – the person’s upbringing, the
circumstances of the person at the time of commission of the act, and any identifier that may
distinguish the responses of one particular individual from that of another.45 This may lead us
down a slippery slope of every act becoming permissible one every possible parameter
affecting the actor is taken into consideration. For instance, a genetic predisposition towards
aggression coupled with a history of abuse may well lead a person to violence to the
detriment of society; would one, in order to determine the permissibility of the act, have to
universalize such a predisposition and the history of violence in order to justify the act, or

40

Nina Bull, The Biological Basis of Value, 53 THE SCI. MONTHLY 170, 170–74 (1941); THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 103 (1651).
41
TIERNEY, supra note 18, at 70.
42
Kant’s rejection of suicide as being an act in contravention of the categorical imperatives will be discussed in
detail later in this chapter in the analysis of the third categorical imperative.
43
See generally, Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1988).
44
See generally, Paul Dietrichson, When is a Maxim Fully Universalizable?, 55 KANT-STUDIEN 143 (1964).
45
Sedgwick, supra note 5, at 84.
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could the autonomy of agency be nonetheless assumed?46 The argument sought to be made
by such theories is that the idea of autonomy of the will is a myth, and that any act can be
explained as a summation of circumstances and predispositions. However, the idea of
autonomy under the categorical imperatives does provide an answer. Kant relates the
morality of an act on the basis of its performance due to the capacity of humans to act in a
manner that contradicts their personal desires out of an obligation to do so.47 While
circumstances may (and do) influence one’s acts, the point of human rationality is our
capacity to nevertheless be deliberate in the exercise of our will.
The second categorical imperative follows directly from the foundation of the first. If
no person’s will ought to be of greater force or authority than anyone else’s, it must
automatically mean that no person may be made to act against their own volition in
accordance with the will of any third person, subject again to the restraints placed upon the
will by the fact of human interaction under the first imperative. The second imperative
provides the foundation for the concept of a minimum standard of dignity that ought to be
afforded to every individual to sustain human co-existence without subjecting anyone to
coercion by anyone else.
This idea of dignity provides the grounding for several rights within the categorical
imperatives – the idea that no person ought to be treated as a means to an end and ought to be
treated as an end (a rational and free-willed agent) in themselves does not preclude human
interaction based on consent. I may request a person to do something for my benefit, but this
does not entitle me to demand performance. The person is free to perform the act or not, as
they deem fit. They might request some consideration for such performance. The primary
factor would have to be the consent of the parties. The same is evidenced in contract law,
which provides for the nullification of contracts that are not completely volitional, where
consent was induced by unfair means (through coercion, misrepresentation, or fraud).48 The
absence of coercion and the need to be informed (particularly where a fiduciary relationship
exists between the contracting parties) have long been essential elements of any contract.49
Likewise, one may present a conceptualisation of human dignity where the lack of education
may, in certain circumstances, repudiate the validity of consent due to lack of information. A
lack of education may affect a person’s capacity to enjoy their right to autonomy. An
uneducated person may face undue influence or coercion by those who are educated. The
state, as a regulator of such behaviour as contradicts the categorical imperatives50 may now
be seen to be bound to either inspect each private contract to ensure that such coercion is not
being affected or seek to ensure that the conditions for such coercion cannot arise, through
the provision of education.51
46

See generally BRUCE N. WALLER, AGAINST MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2011).
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 200(Mary Gregor tran., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
48
For example, section 19 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 makes contracts which were agreed to without free
consent voidable at the instance of the party whose consent was not free. The Indian Contract Act, No. 9 of
1872, INDIA CODE (1993), vol. 2, http://indiacode.nic.in. Likewise, in Barton v. Armstrong, the Privy Council
held that consent obtained under duress rendered the contract voidable. 3 ALR 355, 271 (Austl.).
49
See Herbert A Holstein, Vices of Consent in the Law of Contracts, 13 TUL. L. REV. 560, 564, 571, (1939);
Saul Litvinoff, Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and an Epilogue on Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 1 (1989).
50
The concept of the state as a regulator of human behaviour puts the state in the position of being analogous to
an extremely powerful person, such as the one proposed by Hobbes (HOBBES, supra note 40, at 107). In such a
conception, the state acquires the capacity to behave as a person through its agents, who act on behalf of the
state. This state may now exert its influence on the behaviour of other people, thus becoming one of the factors
that may limit a person’s freedom to act. Since the state is in effect run by people, it stands to reason that the
power granted to it over other people should not restrain people beyond the amount they would have been in the
absence of the state (but with the assumption of peaceful co-existence).
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One may question the nature of rights vested in a person unaware of the right; can a person without the
knowledge of entitlement to a right be capable of being vested with the right nonetheless? This would
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The second imperative, however, contradicts one of Kant’s theories on the obligations
and rights of the state. Per Kant, states are permitted to tax individual basic goods to support
organizations providing to those who cannot fend for themselves.52 However, taxing an
individual is a way of using the person as a means rather than as an end, unless such
contributions to the tax fund were entirely voluntary. The model also does not account for a
state focused on the protection of individual freedoms and/or property (to the extent
permissible under the categorical imperatives), simply because any such state would require
resources to perform such a role. The primary means of gaining such resources for use by the
state has historically been through taxation. Funds raised through the provision of public
utilities (in an entirely libertarian set up) are likely to be inadequate to cover funding security
– any service would require a profit margin to be maintained, meeting that profit margin
would necessarily prevent subsidising the rate at which the service may be offered to the
public and such a rate is unlikely to be able to compete with private service providers whose
only concern would be personal profits. If the service is monopolized by the state, the fourth
categorical imperative is contradicted as the autonomy of the individual to provide that
service is stifled. Therefore, the state can either charge for the services of protecting
individual autonomy, which would lead to the lack of protection of the autonomy of certain
individuals, contradicting the first53 and fourth imperatives, or impose taxes to fund security.
The existence of the state as an agent to protect (everyone’s mutually compatible) individual
autonomy (and by implication, its right to tax people for the purposes of funding security)
becomes necessary. The imposition of taxes for the protection of individual liberties could be
based on an implied consent given by the individuals taxed in order to bypass the second
imperative.54 Taxation imposed by the state on various transactions or acts could be avoided
by the individual insistent upon refusing to pay taxes in the same manner as regulation of
activities may be avoided by such an individual – by not participating in the civil society.
At this juncture, it may be relevant to note that the primary counter to the egalitarian
nature of universalizing the act of the individual (and indeed, to the idea of human interaction
being the basis of deriving ‘natural’ rights in Kant’s theory) has been that posed by Henry
Sidgwick, what he refers to as the strong man argument:55 a policy of egoism favours the
strong man capable of independent sustenance, while egalitarian models are more likely to be
endorsed by those who perceive themselves to be incapable of a completely independent
existence.56 The strongman argument posits that a person who is, or believes himself to be,
necessitate a foray into the conflict of will and interest theories on the nature of rights, which is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, for the purposes of this discussion, Kant’s categorical imperatives are dictates on
the permissibility of acts. Where acts contradict an imperative, such as the infringement on autonomy by the use
of misrepresentation or fraud violates the second imperative by treating the uneducated person as a means to an
end and therefore, the state, as the regulator of human behaviour in practice, is duty bound to prevent this,
whether or not the person whose rights are infringed is aware of it.
52
KANT, supra note 56, at 136.
53
The act in such a case would be to refuse the protection of the state to those who are incapable of affording
such protection, the maxim of the act being the incapacity to afford protection of one’s liberty (or, in order to
prevent the inclusion of the state as an individual actor for the CI process, the maxim could be the incapacity of
preventing others from infringing upon one’s liberty). This is only a problem when someone does actually
infringe upon another person’s exercise of their own liberty; the primary act therefore includes the fact of
infringement, i.e., a person infringes upon the autonomy of another and the other has no means of protecting
themselves. This is in itself a contradiction of the fourth imperative whereby the autonomy of the will of a
person is contradicted upon universalization of the maxim of the lack of protection of autonomy.
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Kant himself favours this interpretation, stating that the taxation must be done in such a way that the “people
taxes itself;” thereby bringing in the necessary consent that bypasses the infringement on the categorical
imperatives. KANT, supra note 56, at 135.
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KANT-STUDIEN 346, 354 (2009).
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strong enough to take care of all their own needs will never concede to a framework of justice
whereby his acts are limited due to interaction with other people which, in the strongman’s
opinion, are wholly unnecessary given the strongman’s capacity to take care of himself.
Consequently, any model of rights that is based on the fact of human interaction fails due to
the lack of applicability when the premise of interaction is itself rejected.
One objection to the strongman argument has been that it fails to consider unforeseen
circumstances that may incapacitate the strongman, leading him to require both interaction
with other people and their assistance. This objection, however, begs the question of whether
the independence-valuing strongman would actually concede that unforeseen circumstances
merit assistance – they may very well believe that incapacitation in any unforeseen
circumstances would be merited and therefore, refuse assistance and interaction just the
same.57 Another counter to the strongman principle has been by Rawls through his
modification of the Categorical Imperatives to include a veil of ignorance58 at the time of
formation of the framework of rights, thus precluding anyone from knowing whether or not
they are actually capable of a completely independent existence. The decision makers (in the
traditional veil-of-ignorance set-up) are, however, aware of the characteristics of the people
without knowing which set of characteristics will apply to their own lives.59 Therefore, there
may be a chance that a large number of people do qualify as Sidgwick’s strongmen and
therefore, as a consequence of faith in the odds being in favour of them being strong enough
to benefit from egoism, a majority of individuals could very well choose to endorse a policy
of egoism to the detriment of the weak-men in the group. The only means of avoiding this
consequence is if the second Rawlsian principle of justice60 is applied, viz., and the policy
that enhances the status of the least benefited person is endorsed. Imposing the veil of
ignorance does, however, provide a practical counter to the problem of Kant’s misogynistic
analogies61: it seems extremely unlikely that any misogynistic policy would be endorsed
when there is an almost equal chance of being benefited by the policy as there is of the policy
being to one’s detriment. However, the entire veil-of-ignorance solution is more grounded on
a prediction of human behaviour62, which may or may not pan out.
Another objection to the strongman argument is nonetheless possible. If the
imperative were applied to universalize the maxim of every act, the maxim of independence
held by the strongman would necessarily include the circumstances of such a maxim, viz. the
fact of the strongman’s capacity for independent living (or belief in its truth) would also
similarly have to be universalized. Since such universalization of individual capacity is
impossible, the maxim cannot truly be universalized without frustrating a fact of human
57

SIDGWICK, supra note 55. Sidgwick suggests this on the basis of the person valuing a policy of egoism being
generally enforced without exceptions as being of greater benefit to the individual than the idea of certain
exceptions being made to the policy whereby certain circumstances permit benevolence or obligate benevolence
over the general policy of mutual indifference.
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JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 175–76 (2000). Rawls inserts a
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such as whether or not to endorse a policy of egoism) what their place in the social set-up would be.
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JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17–21 (Harv. Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999).
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Id. at 60–64.
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See supra note 5.
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The prediction is that of rational agents, granted; it is unlikely that rational agents would act in a manner that
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existence, being the lack of uniformity in our individual strengths and weaknesses. While this
does not necessarily frustrate a will of every natural being, it may be argued that the act is
frustrated under the first categorical imperative due to the impossibility of universalizing the
maxim.
The third imperative provides the primary grounding for Kant’s objection to both
suicide and homosexuality63 – any maxim that is against the “will of every natural being”
cannot be permissible. Taking our original assumption of self-preservation as a natural will of
every living being into consideration, universalizing the decision to kill oneself to be rid of
the pain of one’s circumstances would annihilate humans.64 As mentioned earlier, the
annihilation of humans doesn’t violate the categorical imperatives as much as render any
need for the categorical imperatives (or any other regulatory regime) infructuous. With the
question of homosexuality as well, the argument for prohibition rests squarely on the
frustration of the “natural will” to procreate / propagate the species when the act is
universalized.65 However, one of the arguments against such a stance has been that
procreation as an end is merely not advanced by homosexuality. The fact that it is not
advanced does not necessarily frustrate the end entirely;66 it is perfectly possible for
homosexual people to indulge in procreative sex when the end of procreation is desired.
Furthermore, imposing an absolute duty to procreate (or preventing a person from indulging
in an activity that does not, by itself, contradict the categorical imperatives to further the
cause of procreation) contradicts the second imperative as it considers individuals as means
to the end of the propagation of the human species. Taking the fourth imperative into
account, requiring every person to procreate infringes upon the autonomy of people to choose
whether to indulge in procreation at all. The imperative would have to consider possible
contradictions of other imperatives prior to enforcement of any restriction on an act;
therefore, one would have to read in the words “subject to the fulfilment of the other
imperatives” as a proviso within the third imperative as a safety valve against inherently
contradictory restrictions.
The fourth categorical imperative follows directly from the rationale behind the first
imperative – that the autonomy of the will is paramount to the extent compatible with a
similar manner of autonomy for everyone else in the social set up under consideration. It
grounds the ideologically libertarian nature of the rights set up under the Kantian framework
(and under the various declarations of human rights executed around the same time) – no
person ought to be deprived of their liberty when the exercise of such liberty (a) does not
interfere with the liberty of anyone else who may be affected by it and (b) does not otherwise
contradict the categorical imperatives. While the categorical imperatives are targeted toward
identifying acts of individuals that are to be regulated by the state, this imperative requires the
state to prohibit restraints on liberty and autonomy, impliedly imputing that the state as well
is bound to ensure that the autonomy of individuals is not transgressed.
The fourth imperative captures the pith of the argument that the difference between the CPRs
and the ESCRs is that the former imposes restraints on the state while the latter imposes
positive obligations thereon. A basic reading of the imperative itself provides one counter to
63

KANT, supra note 33, at 96–98.
Self-sacrifice is only prohibited when done as an act of self-indulgence, however, under the Kantian regime.
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this argument, however: that the state is not only required to restrain itself from generally
infringing upon the liberties of individuals, but must also actively regulate the acts of
individuals to ensure that people are prohibited from infringing upon the liberties of others as
well. This not only requires the state to actively regulate the acts of individuals in this regard,
but also demands that a regime is in place to ensure the enforcement of such restrictions, both
in terms of civil and criminal law, the state must necessarily have a judicial system in place to
provide effective remedies against unfair transgressions on personal liberties actuated by
individuals. This has been a standard refutation against the notion of CPRs being ‘negative’
and ESCRs being ‘positive.’67
The four categorical imperatives as listed above provide the basic framework upon
which all other theories of statehood and right may be worked out in the Kantian system. I
shall now move into an analysis of the nature, rights and duties of the state in Kant’s theories
to identify the primary obligations incumbent upon a state in relation to the education of its
citizens.

THE IDEAL STATE: RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO
EDUCATION
Kant, in his various works on state and right, provides a model of childcare, which
may be used to determine a system for the right to education within the regime of the
categorical imperatives.68 According to Kant, children are brought into this world by their
parents without their consent, placing the primary responsibility of care of children upon their
parents.69 They therefore, “incur the obligation to make the child content with his condition
so far as they can.”70 The duty imposed is absolute and would not violate any of the
imperatives primarily because the original choice to procreate was (assumedly) a voluntary
decision made in the exercise of one’s natural autonomy.. Despite the comparisons to
property that Kant later draws to the children to elucidate the manner of rights available to
parents in relation to their children, Kant explicitly states that the children themselves cannot
be abandoned to luck or fate by their parents simply because they are in the unique position
of being right-holders themselves despite their previous non-existence. The circumstance of
being human entitles them to an equal claim to the rights derived from the categorical
imperatives.71
Later on in the discourse, Kant describes the rights of parents in respect of the child
corresponding with the duty of care imposed upon them: they have the right to educate the
child in the manner that they deem fit for the purposes of the child’s development, with the
caveat that this be aimed minimally at ensuring the capacity of the children to eventually look
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For instance, Article 2(2) of the ICCPR reads, “. . . each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
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after themselves.72 Varden, in her analysis of the model proposed by Kant for the purposes of
childcare, draws comparisons between the child in the childcare model and people in need of
aid due to their incapacity to care for themselves in order to support the idea that the Kantian
system may be compatible with a limited ethics of care model without actually destroying its
foundation on individual autonomy.73
Varden posits that if such caregiver models are actual contracts entered into by
consenting adults with no regulation whatsoever, it would be tantamount to a master-slave
relationship.74 The care-receiver contracts away decision-making to the caregiver.75 Due to
the assumed incapacity of the care-receivers, they become bound to accept whatever decision
the caregiver makes for them. Varden argues that such an absolute submission of will is
intuitively against the liberal ideology otherwise espoused in the Kantian regime.76 Here, the
state’s role in regulating and enforcing such fiduciary relationships provides the necessary
limitation: the care-giver cannot be arbitrary in decisions made that affect the person cared
for and must take actions only in the best interests of the care-receiver.77 Where a state
regulates such fiduciary relationships, and is effective in enforcing good faith therein, Varden
argues, the nature of these contracts is no longer slavish and unacceptable.78 This is the basis
of justifying the establishment of a public authority to regulate the way care is provided to
individuals who require it.
Moving on, while the State is required to ensure good faith in childcare, the primary
responsibility of it, as mentioned earlier, rests with the parents.79 One may assume that
indulging in the act of procreation when one does not have the funds to care for the child and
raise the child until the child can take care of itself could be equivalent to borrowing a sum of
money on the false promise that the debt can be repaid.80 While borrowing with no intention
to repay the debt, per Kant, is against the categorical imperatives,81 there remains the problem
of persons who, due to unforeseen circumstances become incapable of taking care of children
that they have brought into the world. This could also be stretched to include those who are
incapable of taking care of themselves because of unforeseen circumstances and therefore,
require either the help of voluntary philanthropists or the help of a state that taxes individuals
to provide for these situations.82
Furthermore, even if parents who procreate, knowing that they do not have the means of
fulfilling their obligations of childcare, are to be held responsible for the same does not solve
the problem of there being children who have been brought to the world without their consent
and are incapable of looking after or raising themselves.83 Since the private philanthropist
72
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model works solely on voluntary acts or contributions toward the cause, there may or may not
be sufficient funds or manpower to cover the total costs of childcare for every child without
access to care and education. Universalizing the maxim of the act of not providing for such
children would violate the fourth categorical imperative as far as the children are concerned–
the autonomy of their will has been violated since they have not consented to their own
existence and are nevertheless forced to attempt survival (considering suicide to alleviate one
of one’s painful circumstances was forbidden in the first place) with neither the means nor
the knowledge of how to survive in society.
While the establishment of the authority to govern private care relations has already
been justified in this paper, the role of such an authority thus far has been primarily
regulatory. It is required to ensure that private contracts for care are not abused. There has
been no argument for the establishment of a publicly funded or maintained care system to
provide care to those who cannot afford it. The establishment of relations of fiduciary care,
where such relations do not already exist or are not freely contracted into by the individual
agents themselves is not yet accounted for. Libertarianism abhors the creation of such
relationships: it states that caregivers should not be required to bear personal responsibility
for the circumstances of those in need of care by the state.84 Thus, the problem of there being
people in need of care due to no fault of their own simultaneously with there being no people
who personally owe such a duty of care to them remains to be addressed. An analysis of the
role of the State in the Kantian framework can provide the necessary theoretical justifications
for these obligations being imposed upon the State.
In Kant’s theories, the ideal state is largely envisaged as a regulator of human
behaviour limited to the bare extent necessary to preserve personal autonomy and private
transactions. For Kant, the state is the ultimate arbiter of human actions and makes
regulations in accordance with the categorical imperatives and enforces prohibitions against
acts that are contrary to the dictates of the imperatives.85 Since the imperatives themselves are
largely liberal in their ideology, the state conceived in this form is also similarly focused on
maximizing the available autonomy for every individual on an equal basis – Kant rejects the
idea of a paternalistic state as being extremely despotic in its treatment of all its subjects as
children as opposed to moral agents with the ability to reason and the autonomous right to act
thereupon. The state, in Kant’s conceptualization, is as much a moral agent as an individual.86
In such a scenario, the state (and all its agents acting under its authority) would also be bound
by the categorical imperatives. It would be counterintuitive if the imperatives were to be
followed by all individuals but could be bypassed by agents of a state. Such agents are
ultimately individuals themselves. The primary aim of every state is to pursue its own wellbeing. The “well-being” of a state here is not so much the welfare and happiness of its
citizens, but a self-sustaining status or region of a constituted community where the principles
of right are fully respected and maintained among the populace in accordance with the
categorical imperatives.87 This supports the idea that a state, as an entity that seeks to sustain
itself, may be considered a moral agent.
In pursuit of these objectives, the state is fully entitled to tax citizens (in the form of
taxes on ownership of land, excise or trade duties and in the form of mandatory services such
as conscription) under the Kantian framework.88 The only condition on such an imposition of
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tax by the state is that the taxes are imposed by the people or those deputized by the people in
order to ensure compliance with the second imperative.89 When the people are considered to
be taxing themselves, the nature of the act of paying taxes to fund the activities of the state
may be considered to be voluntary. The principle here is quite straightforward: the state
provides services that enable the exercise of individual freedom and autonomy and facilitate
private trade (through the regulation of private transactions by enforcing contracts, for
instance, or by providing the conditions under which trade (both within the community and
with other states) is safe and unhindered), but these functions require resources that are to be
rendered by those benefited in a civil society.
Taxation for the purposes of facilitating care or welfare options for persons unable to
care for themselves, on the other hand, is a little more problematic. Here, the people taxed are
not necessarily those who are to benefit from the regime: if a person has enough resources to
pay taxes to a state, the same resources could be used to fund self-care. The only people who
require the state to fund their care are those who have so little in terms of resources that
requiring them to pay taxes would be futile. Thus, the people taxed in such a scheme are
necessarily those who do not (or may not) directly benefit from the services provided from
the funds raised. While it is true that the taxation may serve as a form of insurance against
future contingencies that the taxpayer may face (the state would then cover for the needs of
the person under such circumstances), it is quite possible that such a contingency never
actually arrives and the taxpayer never receives a direct benefit from the proceeds forwarded
for the purposes of state-funded welfare schemes. There is no motivation then, for such a
taxpayer (comfortable in the availability of private resources to cover for contingencies) to
submit to or endorse a taxation scheme that funds public welfare schemes.
Varden again suggests a solution from within the Kantian framework: the nature of
the Kantian state as a maintainer of individual freedom would be self-contradictory if the
social, economic and political system of the state allowed for the creation of individuals
incapable of exercising their freedom to the same extent as others in the system owing to no
fault or choice of their own.90 While the categorical imperatives aim to maintain autonomy
and restrict undue interference, an incapacity to maintain oneself creates a different sort of
problem: the autonomy of a person has been interfered with despite there being no direct
agent for such interference.91 However, the state is charged with the duty to prevent any form
of interference in autonomy, as opposed to just preventing interference by individual actors.
On the nature of the state’s obligation, Varden states:
Kant’s basic claim is that, once the state establishes its monopoly on
coercion, it must reconcile this monopoly with each citizen’s right to freedom. To
accomplish this, it must establish certain public, systemic measures that ensure
that all citizens’ freedom is subject to public law and not to each other’s arbitrary
private choices…. In so doing, the state ensures that private dependency relations
inconsistent with each citizen’s innate right to freedom do not arise…. the state
must ensure that the larger systems within which people exercise their private
rights, such as the economy, the financial systems, the educational system and the
healthcare system, are reconcilable with each citizen’s right to freedom… For
example, each citizen’s freedom and equality is inconsistent with conditions in
which poor persons’ legal access to means is fundamentally dependent upon rich
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persons’ choices to hire them or to help them with charity.92

Varden asserts that the duty arises due to the exercise of coercion.93 Coercion is implicitly an
interference in autonomy. Anyone exercising any form of coercion would be responsible
here. If the state has a monopoly on coercion, the state bears a high level of responsibility
towards those who have been coerced.
Like the example of poor people’s access to means, one could draw a similar parallel
with the right of children to access education; indeed, the right of children is probably more
justifiable given their innate incapacity to act as independent moral agents. Both due to their
incomplete knowledge of the world’s inner-workings and their incomplete development into
their full potential (both in terms of mental and physical faculties), children cannot be prima
facie assumed to be able to look after their own needs and therefore, must be provided for by
the state to become fully independent moral agents of their own accord. To this end, the
education of these children is an inherent part of the duties owed to children. Furthermore,
where adults have not been provided with the opportunity to enjoy their rights to autonomy in
the same manner as everyone else due to their not having received any formal education, the
state would be duty bound to provide opportunities for such adults to avail of an equivalent
education and therefore attain a more equitable access to the enjoyment of their autonomy.
Taking this one step further, there are different levels at which children may be
provided for by their parents. It is possible that the children of those less capable of providing
for them could be considered in a similar bracket as those whose parents are entirely
incapable of doing so, for the purposes of determining the obligation of the state to provide
childcare. Thus, the obligation of the state would extend to ensuring parity in the quality of
education received by people, in addition to securing the right to education for those deprived
of access. 94
While this reasoning justifies a state’s provision of welfare services, taxation of
citizens unaffected by the needs of care-receivers thus far, can only be justified as a corollary
to the state’s obligation to provide welfare. The argument may be summarized as such: Those
incapable of maintaining themselves have an inherent right to receive welfare from the state.
The state is, therefore, obligated to provide these services. The state requires a source of
funding for the services provided. Those receiving it are ipso facto unable to fund the state
for the services provided and ergo, the state will necessarily have to tax other people for the
provision of these services.
The corollary of taxation for the purposes of welfare has also been conceived of by
Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals, where he states that the state has the right to impose taxes
on people to support organizations providing for the poor, primarily under its right to selfpreservation as a civil society.95 A civil society implies the general will of the people to
preserve themselves as a society in perpetuity96 and therefore, the state has a right to tax
people (operating upon the implied consent of the people to endorse the maintenance of the
civil society through their continued participation therein). As stated earlier, the existence and
interest in maintaining a civil society is a cine qua non for the existence of ethical rules to
govern conduct. This goes with the idea of an established state having a right to use some
coercion for self-preservation, as long as it does not invalidate the consent of the individuals
92
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in the state to be a part of such a society. To quote Kant,
For reasons of state the government is therefore authorized to constrain
the wealthy to provide the means of sustenance to those who are unable to
provide for even their most necessary natural needs. The wealthy have acquired
an obligation to the commonwealth, since they owe their existence to an act of
submitting to its protection and care, which they need in order to live; on this
obligation the state now bases its right to contribute what is theirs to maintaining
their fellow citizens.97

Thereafter, Kant moves on to the specific case of abandoned children and suggests that
wealthy unmarried persons be taxed to provide for their care by institutions maintained by
public funds.98 Kant seems to imply, once again, a duty to procreate – remaining unmarried
and failing to procreate is imputed to be a dereliction of a person’s duty to procreate and
consequently makes such a person liable to take upon the duty of providing for the next
generation of citizens through taxation for the upkeep of children who are not otherwise
provided for.99 However, as explained earlier, requiring every person to procreate amounts to
using a person as a means to the end of preservation of the human race, which, by itself, is
not automatically an end that is justifiable.
Self-preservation at the individual level may be a primary assumption of human
existence under the Kantian model, but I would argue that it stands more as a matter of right
than as a moral duty. While unmarried, wealthy elderly people may certainly be taxed for the
purposes of maintaining children, they can only be taxed in the same manner as everyone
else in society and such taxation must be justified solely on the basis of their continued
participation and benefits already received from participation in civil society: having
benefitted from the socio-political and economic structure that has been established by the
state, they owe a duty of ensuring that the state has the funds required to maintain itself. It
has been argued that under the Kantian framework, the nature of state-funded services
required by individuals in the protection of their persons and property is no different from the
services required by those incapable of maintaining themselves to sustain their lives and/or
develop as fully functioning and independent moral agents and citizens of the state.100
One problem that may be faced in the conceptualisation of state-funded welfare schemes is
the idea that the schemes may serve as incentives to laziness. In the framework conceived by
Kant, the problem is not so much theoretical as it is empirical – the manner in which the state
chooses to distribute basic necessities amongst the poor ought to ensure that it cannot be used
as a means of acquisition by the indigent.101 Naturally, with children, the welfare may be
structured to cease upon the child’s achieving a level of moral agency sufficient to support
independence, whereupon they are themselves likely to become contributing members of the
commonwealth.
In conclusion, the Kantian framework of statehood and individual rights under the
categorical imperatives does provide a comprehensive theoretical basis for welfare (in
particular, for childcare) at three levels. First, the state is charged with the duty to regulate
private relations of care (including those of childcare) to prevent abuse of the rights of the
care-receiver, but must not interfere with the autonomy of the caregiver when the child faces
no abuse. Second, where no caregiver exists, or where circumstances are such that the child
receives inadequate care, the state is required to cover for the shortfall and maintain the child
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(including in providing for the child’s education) until the child can lead an independent
existence. Third, to comply with its duty of care towards such children, the state has the right
to tax its citizens to raise the funds necessary for the maintenance of the institutions that
provide childcare services.
The obligation of a state in relation to the education received by children additionally
includes the obligation to ensure parity of the quality of education received by various
groups. This is where the issue of vouchers may be considered: much like the misguided idea
of ‘separate but equal,’102 leaving education to private regulation is unlikely to ensure parity
in the quality of education received by children in different schools. States must make up for
this problem by ensuring adequate funding is provided to improve and maintain the quality of
all schools that need such funding. [The presumption of choice and the free market economy
automatically pushing the quality of education in private schools without state investment,
support and funding (particularly using the voucher system) has been known to fail].

CONCLUSION
Most States provide for the enforcement of certain human rights within their national
jurisdictions, making Human Rights Law a practical reality. However, dispensing with the
need for philosophical justifications of the right may not be called for just yet: ideological
divides bear witness to the unwillingness of many States to implement human rights that do
not match the policies of their governments. Moreover, theoretical justifications for human
rights are essential to answer the question as to why States must protect certain rights, and
how these rights are to be interpreted and implemented.
The deontological approach to identifying a theoretical justification for the right to
education in the system of rights deduced by Immanuel Kant provides three primary duties
upon states: (i) to regulate private education and ensure that parents and/or guardians do not
abuse their rights in respect of the child’s education, (ii) to provide for free access to
education for all persons who are incapable of accessing educational facilities on their own,
and (iii) to ensure that the quality of education provided by the state is at par with the quality
of privately provided education as well. The nature of education is such that it empowers the
full enjoyment of all of one’s rights – the entitlement to enjoy a right is largely irrelevant
when one is either unaware of the existence of such a right, or if such right can easily be
taken away. In either case, the state fails in its duty to guarantee the right by allowing
circumstances or the acts of third parties to infringe upon a person’s right. States are required
to ensure that the right to education is granted on an equally accessible basis to all of its
citizens. The shift to conservative policies may see several states alter their education funding
policies, thereby failing to fulfil their obligations under the Kantian system.
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